作者：ChenZhao

來源：經(jīng)濟機器（ID：EconomicMachine）

The recent WSJ article by James Mackintosh1 “Everything Screams Inflation”, breathlessly tells the financial world that we are at a “generational turning point” and “investors are woefully unprepared”. A Telegraph article also declared that “The Fed QE Will Cause Inflation This Time”. All of this echoes an avalanche of media and advisory reports in recent months calling for much higher inflation ahead. 

最近詹姆斯·麥金托什在《華爾街日報》發(fā)表文章“一切都在驚呼通脹來了”，他上氣不接下氣的告訴金融界，我們正處在“大時代轉(zhuǎn)折點”，“投資者們完全沒有準(zhǔn)備”。一篇電訊新聞還宣稱，“美聯(lián)儲量化寬松將導(dǎo)致本次大通脹”。所有這些都與最近幾個月媒體和策略報告的大量涌現(xiàn)相呼應(yīng)，市場中充斥著未來通脹將大幅上升的聲音。

Alpine Macro has been trying to address this fear in quite a few research reports. I would like to take a look at the 1970s inflation experience, which no doubt is the “generational turning point” referred to by the WSJ. I remember that episode well, having worked at the Bank of Canada in the 1960s, when the groundwork for the 1970s inflation was laid.  

Alpine Macro在很多研究報告中呼吁這種擔(dān)憂過分了。我們一起看看20世紀70年代的通脹經(jīng)歷，當(dāng)年所發(fā)生的事情無疑是《華爾街日報》提到的“大時代轉(zhuǎn)折點”。我相當(dāng)清楚地記得那一幕，1960年代我曾在加拿大銀行工作，當(dāng)時的情況為1970年代的大通脹打下了基礎(chǔ)。

01

My Brief U.K. Stint In The 1970s

20世紀70年代，我短暫的英國任期

In the early to mid-1970s, when inflation began to soar, I was living in London, having moved the then-small BCA there for a while, to get a ring-side seat to observe what a real inflation looks like. As it turned out, the 1970s saw the greatest peace time inflation. I was not disappointed with the learning experience: The U.K. stock market halved and then halved again; my floating rate mortgage on 100% of my new home moved in six months from 8% to 18%. Sterling collapsed (Chart 1), gold was soaring, coal miners went on strike, reducing power supplies and forcing the economy onto a three-day week. Out-of-work Cockney traders in the city started calling an over-the-counter market in toilet paper!  

上世紀70年代初到中期，當(dāng)通脹開始飆升時，我住在倫敦，把當(dāng)時規(guī)模還很小的BCA搬到那里運營了一段時間，作為一個旁觀者，觀察真實的通脹情況。事實證明，20世紀70年代出現(xiàn)了和平時期最大規(guī)模的通脹。我對這段經(jīng)歷印象深刻：英國股市下跌了一半，然后又除以二；我新房子的抵押貸款浮動利率在六個月內(nèi)從8%提高到了18%。英鎊暴跌（圖1），黃金飆升，煤礦工人罷工，電力供應(yīng)減少，迫使經(jīng)濟一周只能運行三天。城里失業(yè)的倫敦交易員開始在場外交易柜臺叫賣衛(wèi)生紙！

It was already getting scary but when the OPEC oil embargo ran the oil price up in its first of two big moves from $4 to about $10/bbl (Chart 2), it created a huge shortage of gasoline, diesel and jet fuel, and reinforced the already severe shortage of energy from the coal miners strike. Conditions went from being scary to frightening. The oil price later had a second big move to $40/bbl, a 10 bagger for OPEC and a disaster for oil consuming countries. 

事情已經(jīng)變得很可怕了，但就在這時，石油禁運令油價從4美元/桶上漲至10美元/桶（圖2），造成了汽油、柴油和航空燃料的嚴重短缺，并加劇了因煤礦工人罷工造成的能源嚴重短缺。情況從可怕到恐慌。油價后來又出現(xiàn)了第二次大的波動，沖到40美元/桶，歐佩克的天堂，石油消費國的災(zāi)難。

02

America’s Inflation Problem Back Then 

當(dāng)年美國的通脹大麻煩

From 1965 to 1980, U.S. price inflation moved in three major waves from below 2% to a peak of over 14% in 1980 (Chart 2, middle panel). It is important to note that the 1970s inflation was not a surprise. It had reached over 6% in the late 1960s before pulling back after the brief 1970-71 recession. The reason for that 1965-1970 surge was that President Johnson, in the second half of the 1960s, pursued a “guns and butter” policy – fighting an escalating war in Vietnam and another domestic one on poverty, racism and inequality. That was labelled the “Great Society” program and rivalled Roosevelt’s “New Deal” of the 1930s. 

從1965年到1980年，美國物價通脹經(jīng)歷了三次大的波動，從低于2% 的水平上升到1980年超過14%的峰值（圖2，中間部分）。值得注意的是，上世紀70年代的通貨膨脹并不意外。在1970-1971年短暫的經(jīng)濟衰退后之前，它在20世紀60年代末就已經(jīng)達到了6%以上。1965-1970年的激增是因為約翰遜總統(tǒng)在1960年代后半期推行了“大炮加黃油”的政策——在越南戰(zhàn)爭的同時，國內(nèi)打響了另一場關(guān)于貧困、種族主義和對抗不平等的戰(zhàn)爭。這被稱為“偉大社會計劃”，其規(guī)模與影響力與羅斯福1930年代的“新政”不相上下。

The problem was that there was no slack in the economy. In fact, the economy was running on average about 2% above capacity. There was a brief respite during the shallow and brief 1970-71 recession but then the economy roared back and moved 4% above capacity. Inflationary pressures started building rapidly again, having been cooled only temporarily. Under the surface, inflationary pressure was very much alive and well.

問題是經(jīng)濟沒有蕭條。事實上，經(jīng)濟運行水平比平均產(chǎn)能高出約2%。在1970-1971年短暫的經(jīng)濟衰退中曾有過暫時的疲軟，但隨后經(jīng)濟復(fù)蘇，超過產(chǎn)能4%。暫時降溫后，通脹壓力又開始迅速積聚。從表面上看，通脹壓力非常大。

The breakdown of the Bretton Woods System in March 1971 was another major structural reason behind high and rising inflation in the 1970s. Since the end of the WWII, the U.S. was on a quasi-gold standard.3 However, the gold standard was misunderstood. It was frequently a fair-weather standard. If a country does not follow the rules because it doesn’t like the discipline imposed, it loses its primary function of maintaining price stability.

1971年3月布雷頓森林體系的崩潰是1970年代通脹率居高不下并不斷上升的另一個主要結(jié)構(gòu)性原因。自二戰(zhàn)結(jié)束以來，美國一直采用準(zhǔn)金本位制。3然而，金本位制被誤讀了，這常常是一切風(fēng)平浪靜下標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。如果一個國家不遵守規(guī)則僅僅因為它不喜歡被紀律約束，那么它將失去了維持價格穩(wěn)定的主要功能。

Chart 3 shows U.S. gold reserves from 1960 forward. The early stage of the decline in gold reserves reflected a post-war rebalancing of central bank gold reserves but after 1965 when inflationary pressure accelerated, the decline in the gold stock steepened, interrupted only briefly during the 1970-71 recession. This was the classic warning signal from the gold standard: time to tighten monetary policy. By August 1971, the U.S. had to make a decision – deflate to maintain the gold/ dollar link or let the dollar float and escape from the discipline. With the major shift to the left in politics and high unemployment, there was no appetite to deflate. President Nixon opted for delinking the dollar from gold. 

圖3顯示了1960年以后美國的黃金儲備。黃金儲備下降的早期階段反映了戰(zhàn)后中央銀行黃金儲備的再平衡，但在1965年通脹壓力加速后，黃金庫存的下降急劇惡化，僅在1970-1971年經(jīng)濟衰退期間短暫緩解。這是金本位發(fā)出的經(jīng)典警報信號：是時候收緊貨幣政策了。到了1971年8月，美國不得不做出一個決定——緊縮以維持黃金與美元的聯(lián)系，或者讓美元浮動以擺脫這種約束。隨著政治上的重大左傾和高失業(yè)率，當(dāng)局對緊縮沒有興趣。尼克松總統(tǒng)選擇將美元與黃金脫鉤。

The dollar price of gold moved rapidly from $35/oz to $180/oz and the trade-weighted dollar fell in its first phase by about 10%. Inflation soared as prices for anything that was priced off the dollar took off.

黃金美元價格從35美元/盎司迅速升至180美元/盎司，貿(mào)易加權(quán)美元在第一階段下跌了約10%。通貨膨脹沿著任何以美元計價東西的價格上漲。

As I mentioned earlier, oil prices more than doubled in 1970 and more than doubled again in the late 1970s. The U.S. economy was much more oriented toward manufacturing than today so surging crude prices shook the economy very badly. That was when the term “stagflation” was coined, describing a stagnating economy but with high inflation. 

正如前面提到的，油價在1970年翻了一倍多，在1970年代末又漲了一倍多。當(dāng)時的美國經(jīng)濟比今天更傾向于制造業(yè)，因此原油價格飆升嚴重沖擊了美國經(jīng)濟。當(dāng)時“滯脹”一詞被創(chuàng)造出來，用來形容經(jīng)濟停滯但通貨膨脹率卻居高不下。

The Fed was terrified to let this relative price shock get absorbed by the real economy, so they mone-tized it through much of the 1970s, causing the U.S. dollar to decline much further, both against gold and on a trade-weighted basis. The inflationary surge ended in 1981 with Paul Volcker’s “cold bath” policy which included 20% interest rates at the peak.  

當(dāng)年美聯(lián)儲害怕讓這種相對價格沖擊被實體經(jīng)濟吸收，因此他們在20世紀70年代的大部分時間里將其貨幣化，導(dǎo)致美元兌黃金和貿(mào)易加權(quán)匯率的進一步下跌。1981年，隨著保羅沃爾克（paulvolcker）推行的“冷水浴”（cold bath）政策，通脹率飆升結(jié)束，20% 的利率水平也見頂回落。

03

Where Monetarists Have Been Wrong 

貨幣主義者錯在哪里

A major lesson for me from that experience in 1973-74, and the rest of the decade back home later, was to make me hyper-sensitive to inflation and it took me a long time to stop seeing another major inflation outbreak every time the Fed became expansionary, and the Treasury ran bigger deficits. The reality was that, after Paul Volcker gave the economy a cold bath in 1981 and President Ronald Reagan focused on the supply side of the economy in the 1980s, price inflation has been on an irregular path downwards from the 14% peak in 1980 to the (temporary) near-zero reached in April 2020.  

這個十年剩下的時間里我回到了國內(nèi)，1973-1974年的經(jīng)歷給我上了重要的一課，那就是讓我對通脹非常敏感，每次美聯(lián)儲擴張，財政部赤字增加，我都花了很長時間仔細思考另一場大的通脹是否會爆發(fā)?，F(xiàn)實情況是，在1981年保羅·沃爾克（Paul Volcker）給經(jīng)濟洗了個冷水澡，上世紀80年代羅納德·里根（Ronald Reagan）把重點放在經(jīng)濟的供給方面之后，通脹率就一直在不規(guī)則地從1980年14% 的峰值下降到2020年4月（暫時的）接近零的水平。

During much of the 1980s, the money supply (MZM) rose strongly (Chart 4). Milton Friedman’s monetarist model was still in vogue. Inflation fears remained endemic throughout the 1980s. However, the model was deeply flawed because the velocity of money has come down steadily since Volcker’s time, absorbing much of the growth in money supply. 

在20世紀80年代的大部分時間里，貨幣供應(yīng)量（MZM）強勁增長（圖4）。米爾頓·弗里德曼的貨幣主義思想仍然很流行。在整個1980年代，對通脹的擔(dān)憂仍然普遍存在。然而，該模型存在嚴重缺陷，因為自沃爾克時代以來，貨幣流通速度穩(wěn)步下降，吸收了大部分貨幣供應(yīng)的增長。

This is a lesson for all forecasters who rigidly adhere to an outmoded theory. Like everything in economics, you have to look at both demand and supply. In the 1980s, the demand for money soared, a phenomenon then called “monetary re-entry.” Only later on did people realize that velocity of money is simply a function of interest rates and has, therefore, collapsed along with falling price inflation. A slowing velocity has absorbed much money creation, preventing price inflation from sustainably rising. That should be remembered in the context of today’s inflation fears. 

這是所有嚴格堅持過時理論投資人的一個重大教訓(xùn)。就像經(jīng)濟學(xué)中大家學(xué)到的，你必須同時考慮需求和供給。上世紀80年代，貨幣需求猛增，一種后來被稱為“貨幣再注入”的現(xiàn)象，直到后來人們才意識到貨幣速度只是利率的函數(shù)，因此，隨著物價通脹的下降，貨幣的流通速度已經(jīng)崩潰。速度放緩吸收了大量的貨幣創(chuàng)造，防止物價通脹持續(xù)上升。在今天的通脹恐懼中，特別應(yīng)該牢記這一點。

04

Key Takeaways  

關(guān)鍵點

Most people’s mental framework goes back only as far as their own memories and experience and creates a subconscious bias. The 1960-80 period was structurally totally different from today’s. Very few investors, economists, journalists and policy makers today were working then. Some salient differences between then and now are worth noting. 

大多數(shù)人的認知只能追溯到他們自己經(jīng)歷過的歷史，并造成潛意識的偏見。1960-1980年代的經(jīng)濟在結(jié)構(gòu)上與今天完全不同。很少有當(dāng)時的投資者、經(jīng)濟學(xué)家、記者和決策者今天仍在工作。因此，當(dāng)時和現(xiàn)在的一些顯著差異值得注意。

(1) The U.S. was essentially a closed economy in the 1970s. Imports were about 3.5% of GDP. They are now almost four times larger relative to GDP (Chart 5). Imports are a big safety valve; when shortages arise and prices rise, imports increase to take the steam off. That doesn’t happen easily in a closed economy. In addition, there has been a relative abundance of excess savings in the rest of the world. This means that the U.S. can easily import much cheaper foreign savings to make up any shortfall in domestic savings, should the economy run too hot. 

（1） 20世紀70年代，美國基本上是一個封閉的經(jīng)濟體。進口僅占國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的3.5%。而現(xiàn)在幾乎是當(dāng)時的四倍（圖5）。進口是壓力釋放安全閥；當(dāng)出現(xiàn)短缺和價格上漲時，增加進口以緩解壓力。在一個封閉的經(jīng)濟體中，這種情況就很難辦。此外，世界其他地區(qū)的超額儲蓄也相對充裕。這意味著，如果經(jīng)濟過熱，美國可以很方便地進口更便宜的外國儲蓄，以彌補國內(nèi)儲蓄的任何缺口。

(2) Manufacturing then was almost a quarter of the economy; it is 10% now. The world currently is well into the “Fourth Industrial Revolution”, dominated by both technology producers and users, and a perfect storm of technological innovation is occurring and will accelerate in the years ahead. The rapid digitization of the world economy, robotic technology, AI and 5G communication are inherently deflationary which goes a long way towards explaining why the Fed has not been able to get inflation up to its target for more than a decade (Chart 6). 

（2） 當(dāng)時制造業(yè)幾乎占美國經(jīng)濟的四分之一；現(xiàn)在僅為10%。當(dāng)前，世界正進入由技術(shù)提供方和使用方共同主導(dǎo)的“第四次工業(yè)革命”，一場完美的技術(shù)創(chuàng)新風(fēng)暴正在形成，并將在未來幾年加速。世界經(jīng)濟的快速數(shù)字化、機器人技術(shù)、人工智能和5G通信本質(zhì)上是導(dǎo)向通縮的，這在很大程度上解釋了美聯(lián)儲為什么十多年來未能將通脹率提高到目標(biāo)水平的原因（圖6）。

(3) Unionized workers then were 25% of the labor force, now they are about 10%. Labor unions introduce wage rigidity, while reducing labor productivity (Chart 7). In the 1970s and 1980s, wage rigidity was a key reason causing wage-price spiral. Most workers in the U.S. today not only have to compete for jobs among themselves, but also, directly or indirectly, have to compete with workers in low-wage countries as a result of globalization. It is very hard for the average wage rate to sustainably exceed labor productivity. 

（3） 當(dāng)時加入工會的工人數(shù)量占勞動力的25%，現(xiàn)在約占10%。工會引入剛性工資，同時降低勞動生產(chǎn)率（圖7）。在70年代和80年代，剛性工資是導(dǎo)致勞動力價格螺旋上升的一個關(guān)鍵原因。今天，美國的大多數(shù)工人不僅要相互競爭工作，而且由于全球化的影響，還必須直接或間接地與低工資國家的工人競爭。平均工資率很難持續(xù)超過勞動生產(chǎn)率的水平。

The burning question today is whether another major inflationary surge could happen again? My take is that it is possible but very unlikely. Slack in the economy is still substantial, estimated at roughly 2.3% of GDP, in contrast to significant excess demand for much of the 1960s and 1970s. 

今天最緊迫的問題是，是否會再次出現(xiàn)一次嚴重的通脹飆升？我認為這是可能的，但可能性很小。與上世紀60年代和70年代大部分時間的大量過剩需求形成對比的是，今天經(jīng)濟疲軟程度仍然很大，估計約占GDP的2.3%。

Some would argue that the Fed’s monetization during the two oil shocks in the 1970s greatly exacerbated the inflation outbreak and the Fed is monetizing fiscal deficits today. What’s the difference? In my view, the comparison is not entirely correct: Back in the 1970s, the U.S. economy was running above potential, so the Fed eased into a booming economy with no spare capacity. Since 2020, however, the Fed has been easing aggressively on a collapsing economy with unemployment shooting up to 15%. Even today, the U.S. still has 8 million people out of a job. Of course, if the Fed continues this policy long after the economy has fully recovered, that would be inflationary, but it is too early to make that judgment at the moment. 

有人會說，美聯(lián)儲在上世紀70年代兩次石油危機期間的貨幣化大大加劇了通脹的爆發(fā)，美聯(lián)儲如今正在將財政赤字貨幣化。這有什么區(qū)別呢？在我看來，這種比較并不完全正確：早在上世紀70年代，美國經(jīng)濟就已經(jīng)超出了潛力，因此美聯(lián)儲很輕松的得到了一個沒有多余產(chǎn)能的蓬勃經(jīng)濟體。然而，自2020年以來，隨著失業(yè)率飆升至15%，美聯(lián)儲一直在對崩潰的經(jīng)濟采取積極的寬松政策。即使在今天，美國仍有800萬人失業(yè)。當(dāng)然，如果美聯(lián)儲在經(jīng)濟完全復(fù)蘇很久之后繼續(xù)實施寬松政策，那就是通脹，但目前做出這一判斷還為時過早。

How about fiscal stimulus? A lot of the fiscal thrust with current policy is in the form of transfer payments and has nothing like the demand impact of government expenditure in goods and services via investment. In addition, these transfer payments will reverse in good part in the year ahead. President Biden's infrastructure proposals will get scaled back as will the tax hike proposals. It is hard to believe that the Fed would remain aggressively expansionary once inflation is moving back to where they are aiming. 

財政刺激有啥后果？現(xiàn)行政策中的許多財政推動力是以轉(zhuǎn)移支付的形式出現(xiàn)的，與政府通過投資在商品和服務(wù)方面的支出對需求的影響完全不同。此外，這些轉(zhuǎn)移支付在未來一年將在很大程度上逆轉(zhuǎn)變成拖累。拜登總統(tǒng)提出的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)方案和增稅方案都將被縮減。很難相信，一旦通脹回到他們的目標(biāo)，美聯(lián)儲會繼續(xù)積極擴張。

With the dramatic reduction in the U.S. economy's oil intensity (Chart 8), there cannot be a major oil shock like the 1970s. If anything, the oil price is likely to reinforce deflationary pressures as the decarbonization of the economy proceeds and technology continues to reduce the cost of green alternatives. The mania in anything green means that access to capital is seemingly unlimited and this has to increase the supply of energy alternatives. 

隨著美國經(jīng)濟石油需求密集度的急劇下降（圖8），不可能出現(xiàn)上世紀70年代那樣的重大石油沖擊。如果非要說有什么影響的話，隨著經(jīng)濟的脫碳進程和科技不斷降低綠色替能源的成本，油價可能會承受更大的通縮壓力。任何綠色能源的狂熱都意味著該行業(yè)獲得資本的途徑似乎是無限的，這業(yè)必將增加替代能源的供應(yīng)。

注：文章為作者獨立觀點，不代表資產(chǎn)界立場。

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原標(biāo)題： 艾摩宏觀：1970年代通貨膨脹經(jīng)驗與教訓(xùn)